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In our daily work as judges every ruling is of critical impor-tance to the immediate parties. Most escape notice by themedia. But from time to time, we are presented with cases
where press and public join the fray. 
How do we address these cases? How should we address
them? High-profile cases certainly appear to differ from the
norm, if for no other reason than the extent of the pressures
they clearly impose on us.  But, at heart, do they really require
us to change what we do? 
I was presented with a high-profile case a little more than a
decade ago, one that the court on which I served and I both
chose to handle in a way that differed from our customary
approach. Despite all the apparent or superficial differences, in
the end I came to the conclusion that while a high-profile case
unavoidably requires varying degrees of logistical adaptation,
its substantive resolution is effective only if it is guided by the
very same principles we apply to our daily practice of the judi-
cial art. 
This is my story.
In 1999, the State of Washington had long had a motor
vehicle excise tax, the MVET, that provided the State with sub-
stantial revenue that it spread among a broad array of state pro-
grams, many of them entirely unrelated to motor vehicles.
Given the size and duration of the tax, it was understandable
that the public disliked the MVET. I was not immune to those
feelings. Several years earlier, I had bought a used car and
found to my frustration not only that the tax rate was high but
also that the basis for my specific tax calculation was twice
what I had actually paid for the vehicle. Even modest vehicles
could bring with them a tax tab that would add up to thou-
sands of dollars in just a few years. Despite repeated public
demand, the legislature had not limited or revised this tax. 
Enter the public’s solution to the MVET problem. Like a good
number of states, Washington has an initiative process by which
citizens can gather signatures to place a draft law before the vot-
ers. In 1999, an initiative known by its number as I-695 was
placed on the ballot. It was drafted to require a reduction of the
MVET to a flat $30 per year per vehicle and, at least as impor-
tant, to require that a public vote be scheduled and held before
any governmental entity could increase any tax, fee, or charge. 
I-695 passed with a substantial majority of the popular vote.
The law’s passage threatened significant cuts in public funding
for numerous programs. Therefore, as soon as the vote count
was finalized, the law was challenged by a number of public
and private entities, several citizens, and a public union. Suits
were filed in various counties around the state. 
All of these cases were consolidated and then assigned to
my court. I was not worried. It promised to be an extremely
interesting case. The lawyers were excellent. I anticipated high
quality research and briefing, accompanied by vigorous and
articulate argument. From a judge’s perspective, what could be
better? 
Moreover, because Washington caselaw directs that initia-
tives passed upon public vote are presumed to be constitu-
tional and cannot be held unconstitutional unless clearly
proved to be so “beyond a reasonable doubt,” I had immedi-
ately assumed that I would be likely to uphold the initiative.
That sanguine view, so reassuring on initial assignment, did
not last. As briefing came in, and as I researched the law, I
found the challengers’ arguments increasingly persuasive that
the initiative had transgressed clear constitutional limits.
Speaking personally, the prospect of holding a tax-cutting
initiative unconstitutional was a matter for profound worry.
Like most state judges, I was elected, and as a general-jurisdic-
tion judge in Washington I was subject to open election con-
tests every four years. Worse, 2000 was a judicial election year.
Worse still, the parties’ stipulated schedule called for me to
issue my ruling in March 2000, a mere three months before
anybody with a Washington law license could simply pay a
modest filing fee, register his or her name with the State, and
run against me. 
More than one judicial colleague suggested that if I were
about to find the law unconstitutional, I should arrange to
have the case reassigned to a retiring judge, who would not be
subject to an election challenge. As appealing as that proposi-
tion sounded on a personal level, I declined the invitation. I
feared that to do so would legitimately be seen by the public as
compromising the integrity of the judicial system. Citizens
could perceive any reassignment as proof that the judiciary and
other members of the government were trying only to protect
themselves and their income, that they hadn’t given and
wouldn’t give fair consideration to the public’s concerns. 
So, instead, I focused on the fact that I had already had a
good ten years on the bench, and decided that if my career
were to be threatened or even terminated by a controversial
decision either way, I would redouble my efforts to make the
ruling be as fair and as clear as I could.
MAKING THE DECISION ACCESSIBLE
With what I feared could be a premature end to my judicial
career looming over me, I decided that the first step had to be
giving the voters immediate and direct access to any ruling. I
had to compose the ruling to allow non-lawyer voters, even
those with no more than a high-school education, to have a
reasonable chance of reading, considering, and then under-
standing my reasoning. I wanted to allow them not only to
understand what I had ruled but to understand, and possibly
even to appreciate, why I had issued that ruling. And of course,
to do that, our court also had to find a way that the text could
be made physically accessible to the public.
Composition
How to explain to the public why I had to strike down what
they had voted for, if that indeed were my final ruling? That
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would not be easy. In my experience, parties on both sides stop
paying close attention to judicial reasoning as soon as they
know who has “won” and who has “lost.” Because justice suf-
fers if losing parties believe they have not been heard, I had
years before developed a practice when parties were present to
hear an oral ruling to start by reciting and then addressing the
losing party’s strongest arguments in an affirmative way. I
would try to acknowledge the strength of those arguments,
particularly those that were most emotive. Only then would I
give the explanation of why those arguments, as compelling as
they might otherwise seem, were legally insufficient; and,
finally, I would announce the specific ruling. 
Simply put, my general practice was immediately and affir-
matively to recognize the losing party (only rarely does a los-
ing party deserve immediate harsh commentary) and show
genuine respect for their position. Savvy court watchers came
to realize that in my court the first party to receive favorable
mention would often be the party who was about to lose on the
central issue. But the simple fact was that starting with the 
positives for the losing party would mean that the losing party
would still have been able to listen to much of my ruling,
rather than feeling shut out from the start. 
So I planned to start my written decision on I-695 with 
positive acknowledgment of the losing party’s overall position.
Nonetheless, however important it was to provide the losing
party with affirmative recognition, I still had to face the ques-
tion of how actually to write both the “what” and the “why” in
plain English. 
Drafting
As to the writing process, it was obvious that I should not
compose the decision as if it were a law-review article or an
appellate brief. As simple as that goal is to state, making that
choice would require a change from our normal patterns. The
style of legal writing that most of us have been taught, starting
from our law school days, is rarely clear. Trained as lawyers to
rely on precedent, we somehow seem to have become con-
vinced that we cannot think a thought unless somebody else
has thought it before. We preface each point with the citation
of cases or quotations, many of which, viewed honestly, are not
really on all fours with the point being argued. And as judges
we all know that when attorneys compose the briefing that
they submit to us at trial or on appeal, all too many of them are
driven by the misguided notion that simply increasing the
number of citations will impress us or a higher court to rule in
their favor. 
This prevailing style of legal writing interferes not only with
the flow of reading but also with the flow of reason. But
because it is what we are used to, we not only tolerate it, we
fall into the same trap. I wanted out of that trap. As my first
step, I adopted a practice already known to and used by many
trial attorneys:  writing and speaking as if I were explaining my
legal point to an interested, but not legally educated, neighbor.
It works for attorneys presenting to juries. It ought to work
just as well for judges explaining a point to the broader public. 
I then applied one more drafting technique. Once I had
completed my research, heard all the arguments of counsel,
outlined the issues, identified the principles compelling the
decision, and reached my key legal conclusions, I sat down and
wrote the decision straight through, in plain English, without
turning back to my outline, and without any citations. I sim-
ply identified questions, principles and rulings, trying to do so
as if I were talking with my neighbor. Only at the end of the
drafting process, after I had summarized the arguments, my
reasoning, and my rulings in what was as close as I could come
to everyday English, did I go back to locate and insert the few
necessary and central citations and quotes that I believed had
required me to make the decision I had reached. 
As a result, the text really did seem to flow much more read-
ily. Interestingly, only weeks later, after I had completed and
announced my ruling, whenever newspapers reprinted por-
tions of the decision (one paper filled two full-sized pages with
the entire text of my discussion from start to finish), case
names and formal citation references were always eliminated.
As a result, what remained on the newspaper page was in fact
the very same wording I had started with, which I felt allowed
my ruling to be more easily understood. 
Distribution
While my first task was to make my ruling intellectually
accessible, I knew that step alone would not be enough. I also
had to make the decision actually and physically accessible to
any person who was interested. Those of us who are trial
judges know that that simple concept actually points up one
major problem we all face:   then, as now, trial court rulings
were not generally published in books or made publicly avail-
able in advance sheets or other official reporters. And,
although it was little more than a decade ago that I was prepar-
ing to issue this ruling, the internet at that time had barely
been utilized in any meaningful or user-friendly way by most
state courts. Very few trial courts then had a public web page.
Our court was no exception. We had no system that permitted
legal professionals, let alone ordinary citizens, any internet
access to court filings and rulings. 
Despite these limitations, I was determined to find a way to
help the public and the media understand both the ruling and
the court’s assigned role. The parties had already stipulated
that, whatever my ruling, it would bypass the court of appeals
and be appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Our Supreme Court did have a web page at that time, so I con-
tacted them. Because my ruling would be the very ruling that
the Supreme Court would be reviewing, they considered it to
be an essential element of the court’s record and the court’s
business. Therefore, and particularly in light of the under-
standably great public interest in whatever the tax-related rul-
ing would be, the Court agreed to have my ruling publicly
posted on the Supreme Court’s own website immediately upon
issuance. We arranged that I would electronically transmit my
decision to Supreme Court staff ten minutes before it was to be
announced in my court, so that it could be entered onto their
web page (not an instantaneous process in 2000) and public
access be enabled as soon as I had finished delivering my rul-
ing in open court. 
I should add here that, given the positive reaction our court
system ultimately received for establishing this sort of access to
a high-profile decision, our trial court developed a publicly
accessible web page within the following year. On that page,
we chose to include links by which the public and press could
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1. As it turns out, given the significance of the case, Westlaw reported
the full text of the decision online almost immediately; see,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. State of Washington, 2000 WL
276126 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 14, 2000).
immediately access rulings in any and all civil and criminal
cases decided in our court that had a significant degree of pub-
lic interest. A decade later, we continue that practice.
Oral Delivery
Print and electronic media had been granted permission to
be in the courtroom and to record and broadcast the delivery
of the decision. Because we also expected large numbers of the
public to attend, we scheduled the hearing in our presiding,
and largest, courtroom. 
The question of what words a judge should utter in open
court is never a minor one and was doubly important in a case
such as this. Among other things, the full decision was too
long to be read out loud. In any event, delivering a lengthy rul-
ing orally to the TV cameras could easily be viewed as grand-
standing. On the other hand, entering the courtroom and sim-
ply handing out the decision, saying only, “This is the Court’s
ruling,” and then departing, would present a different and two-
fold problem. It could be viewed either as imperious or, alter-
natively, as a sign that the court feared and was dodging pub-
lic scrutiny. Further, were I to choose to speak briefly but
extemporaneously about my ruling and its reasons, I could by
a careless choice of words inadvertently and unnecessarily cre-
ate an appealable issue. With the complexity and significance
of the case, that was not an idle concern. 
To address these problems, I decided simply to read the
introductory text from the ruling, plus a summary paragraph
from each section of the ruling, so that every single word I
uttered in open court would match key portions of the text
word-for-word. Then, to facilitate public access and under-
standing, I also had these orally delivered excerpts from the
ruling printed up in advance, for delivery to the press and pub-
lic in attendance at the hearing; in the footer on each page we
printed in bold type the specific web address at which the full
text could be accessed. 
This planned public access went off without a hitch. When
the hearing was over, both the electronic and print media
repeatedly recited not only the key portions of the ruling, but
placed the web link on the screen on TV news programs and
on the page in print media. As a result, thousands upon thou-
sands of copies of the decision were downloaded on the first
day, and were thereby immediately available across the State.1
INITIAL PUBLIC REACTION
A ruling like this does not always face easy sailing. Not sur-
prisingly, once I had issued the ruling striking down the pub-
lic tax-cutting initiative, the initial response was outrage. It
was public. It was immediate. It was vociferous. Within min-
utes of my departure from the bench, the charismatic sponsor
of the initiative took the floor in the public section of the pre-
siding courtroom and angrily denounced my ruling to the
attendant television cameras as the action of a “king.” Many
members of the public slammed the decision. Many wrote
angry letters to the press and complained on call-in shows.
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Others sent letters and emails to me, with one threatening, “In
revolutions we hang people like you from the nearest lamp-
post.” Another citizen called repeatedly over several weeks and
left multiple messages on my court’s answering machine, gen-
erally at 2:00 am, ranting about my decision and talking about
how incompetent I was. 
Although the tenor of public comment actually started to
become more favorable in the weeks following the ruling,
those initial responses were vehement. Stated in its most posi-
tive light, the thrust of the most obvious and vigorously argued
objection was, given the fact that a majority of the public had
voted in a particular manner, and that we had a democracy,
“What is one man doing, overruling the vote of more than a
million citizens?” That is a commonsense question, one that I
had tried to address in the written ruling.
POST-RULING PUBLICITY
Perhaps not too surprisingly, the written ruling had not
fully satisfied those who asked that central question. In
response to their continuing inquiries and emails, our court
therefore also took a step that I would now either advise
against or would modify in a significant manner. Because of
the storm of immediate publicity, and the number of press
requests for further information, the court leadership prevailed
upon me to make myself available for press interviews. 
Up to that time, I had never interacted with any media out-
side the courtroom about any of my rulings. Electronic and
print media had long been free to attend in open court as long
as their presence or conduct did not interfere with a fair hear-
ing or trial, and they were always permitted to record and
broadcast video of court proceedings. I had planned to con-
tinue this pattern here, and to let my words and actions in the
courtroom speak for themselves, and not to speak with mem-
bers of the press on any aspect of any ruling I either was con-
templating or had made.
However, based on the canon of judicial ethics that encour-
ages us to fulfill our duty as judges to educate the public about
the law, I was asked by court leadership to meet with the press
and fill them in on the judicial role in situations such as those
presented by I-695. I agreed to meet with the press, but I also
made it clear to them that I would answer questions about my
training, and about the work of the courts and my work as a
judge, but I would not respond to any questions about the sub-
stance of the ruling or make any comment that could other-
wise relate to or affect the course of the appeal. 
Of course I knew that, one way or another, if I met with the
press, the central question about the judicial role in a democ-
racy (the role of “one man”) would likely be posed, directly or
indirectly. I knew that if it were raised or even simply hinted at
and I did not respond, or seemed to be dodging that question,
it would hang over the interview, confirming the doubts of
those who disagreed with my ruling and thought the ruling
simply to be the political judgment of an “activist” judge. 
After giving the matter careful thought, I felt I could address
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1. THE FUNDAMENTAL JUDICIAL MINDSET:  
They don’t pay me to be right; they pay me to be fair. 
In virtually every case, all sides coming into a trial or a hearing
think that they are right and are entitled to win. Their belief is often
informed by and founded upon all manner of non-legal and non-judicial
considerations. 
When our first goal as judges is to be “right,” we too are necessarily
more likely to focus on the end result and do the same thing the parties
do:  that is, to apply goal-oriented measures, or a predetermined position
on the law, or other preferences from outside the courtroom, and thereby
advertently or inadvertently predetermine the “right” result. 
When we try simply to be fair, then we have instead turned our focus
to the process rather than the end result. Ironically, trying only to be fair
causes us in the long run more likely truly to be right, at least in the eyes
of the law, in large part because we are less likely to have closed our
minds to a party’s argument or otherwise prejudged a matter. 
Adherence to process is at the core of the rule of law. 
2. APPROACHING THE DECISION IN A GIVEN CASE:  
The most important person in the courtroom is the loser. 
The best judges are, in a very real sense, non-judgmental. 
Our first job is not to decide; our first job is to listen. If we are care-
ful to show the losing parties that they have been heard and direct our
explanations to them, their attorneys and, in the long run, the parties
themselves, will more easily accept our decisions. 
The fairness of a legal system is probably best judged by the respect
that a losing party has for the process and for the decision.
3. MAKING THAT DECISION:  
Neutral questions and standards are essential to the
process. 
Pollsters know how to phrase a question to push the responder to a
desired result. Likewise, attorneys know that if they succeed in posing
the key question for the court, they are much more likely to win their
case. 
A judge’s duty is different. How do we, as judges, pose a question that
does not consciously or unconsciously predetermine the outcome? Can
we ask a question in the manner of a truly neutral pollster? On the other
hand, when the mere choice among several possible questions does effec-
tively determine the result, how do we select which question to ask?
What is the neutral principle of choice that we can identify for the par-
ties as explaining and justifying our choice between or among compet-
ing questions? As judges, we should take the time to explain to the par-
ties how and why we selected a particular question. 
But first, we can set the stage during oral argument by telling the
attorneys that when we ask a question in court, we want one of two
things:  either a direct answer to the question, or an explanation of why
they believe our question misses the mark. 
Finally, when trying to resolve difficult evidentiary issues that under-
lie a particular question of law, we can make a proper decision even
when we haven’t been able to figure out the answer to the question of
whom to believe or what facts to rely on. We can resolve factual disputes
as a matter of law:  when we have tried our best and remain unsure of
the facts, or determine that the evidence is evenly balanced, the party
having the burden of proof on that issue loses. I have found that parties
readily understand, and can even come to fully accept, that concept. 
4. CORRECTING FOR AND EXCISING BIAS BEFORE
FINALIZING A DECISION:  
How do we minimize personal pre-judgments and predilec-
tions? 
Writing and then issuing a decision is the final step. But even a fair
decision may fall short in the parties’ eyes if we have not demonstrated
fairness in our conduct in the courtroom, and even in our body language.
Moreover, all of us can be affected by human factors:  e.g., studies
demonstrate that good-looking witnesses are generally deemed more
credible than average-looking witnesses. We must ask ourselves and be
prepared to explain, why do we believe witness A but not witness B?
Have we really listened carefully to both sides?
And when we believe we have reached a decision in a hotly contested
case, but before we have announced it, it is often helpful to identify an
emotive factor that may relate to or be affected by a key issue in the case,
and then figure out a way to flip it—e.g., the gender of respective spouses
in a parenting decision, the ethnicity of alleged actor and victim in cases
involving race, the parties’ religious affiliations in a case involving the
establishment of free-exercise clauses. 
If we would still make the same decision after flipping that factor, we
are probably on solid ground. However, if our decision would change,
we’d better figure out why and either modify our decision or prepare to
explain why that emotive factor makes a difference on the merits. 
5. THE COURT IN A DEMOCRACY:  
The spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not too sure that
it is right. 
We should set aside any personal preferences or initial reactions we
may have to a given dispute and try to embody the philosophy of
Learned Hand:  “The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too
sure that it is right.” 1
It is not enough to “know” that we have reached the “right” decision.
If we are too confident of the rightness of our own ideas or decisions, we
are much more likely to be dismissive of, and not to listen to, those who
appear to differ from us. 
When ruling on a private dispute, we must be able to explain our
decisions in a way that brings the affected persons along with us. And
when ruling on a dispute that raises larger public or political issues, we
must take care to explain not only the substance of our decision but also
why it is the court rather than the legislature or other governmental
body that properly decides the issue in that case or, alternatively, why the
court is not empowered to make the requested ruling because it is
required to defer to a legislative, executive, or administrative body’s
prior determination. 
Genuinely exercising and expressing a degree of humility can actu-
ally enhance respect for the court’s actions and rulings. 
1. Learned Hand, J., The Spirit of Liberty, Address, (May 21, 1944), in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND (Irving Dillard
ed., 1953), at 144.
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2. The Supreme Court’s ruling is reported at Amalgamated Transit
Union v. State of Washington, 142 Wn.2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
the question without talking about the substance of my partic-
ular decision but instead talking about the nature of the judi-
cial role. This was the exchange I had in a television interview
when the predictable central issue of a judge’s role in a democ-
racy was broached: 
Question: Because of your ruling, some people have
said that their vote doesn’t count. Do you feel like you
were in a no-win situation?
Answer: Not at all. I mean, this is a very reasonable
question for people to ask:  “What is one man doing? We
had a million people vote in the following fashion…”
I think the best way to explain that is to say that if I
am doing my job right, I’m not the voice of one man.
When I do a case like this, I study the Constitution, I
study a hundred years of decisions by our elected
Supreme Court Justices. So I think, properly viewed, my
decision is not my decision. This is not the voice of a
man speaking, but really if I have done my job right, it
is the voice of the law developed over a hundred years.
The press on that occasion did not try to ask further ques-
tions about the substantive basis for my ruling. Nonetheless,
given the pressures on media representatives, we all know that
that will not always be the case. 
I have therefore thought long and hard about how we can in
the future deal with inquiries that are fairly crafted, thereby
assisting in public education, but still manage to avoid the risk
of the ruling judge somehow tainting his or her ruling or the
judicial process. There are in fact several possible, and less
risky, alternatives that a court has other than allowing the judge
who issued the ruling to be directly interviewed—alternatives
that will still provide assistance to public understanding. 
We tried one such method in our court in a high-profile case
that occurred only a few years later. When a trial was being con-
ducted of a serial killer with nearly 50 murders to his name, and
lurid coverage was to be expected, we arranged for a judge who
had had no contact with that trial and who would be walled off
from any such contact (so that no inside information would
even inadvertently be shared) to be made available to the press
to discuss general court procedures and processes. And, in
order not to transgress the ethical limitation on judges making
any comments in a way that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that
might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing, all such
communications were agreed to be off the record. 
The process seemed to work well in that case, but there is
an additional and likely even better alternative:   given the
occasionally difficult interaction of public officials and the
press, it may make the most sense for a court not to have a
judge perform such a task but to arrange to have one or more
legal experts fulfill that educational role. It may be a court PR
officer, if a given state’s funding is adequate to allow it, or it
may be a professor, a litigator, a former prosecutor or defender,
or some other experienced and reliable legal professional. 
Whoever the chosen person may be, it is appropriate that
we carefully consider how to fulfill our duty to help educate
the general public about the role of and limitations on the
courts. That is, it is important that we not only identify what
our rulings are, but also explain why we can or can’t perform
certain tasks or undertake certain actions that the members of
the public may wish us to take, or why we are required to take
other actions that members of the public may oppose, and why
a court’s role in any given matter differs substantially from that
of a legislature or other policy-making body. 
FINAL THOUGHTS
After only a few months, the initial ruckus had died down.
The public’s reaction, editorial pages, and letters to editors had
all become significantly more positive. Of course, it probably
also helped that the state legislature had by then finally taken
action relating to the MVET. And in that more peaceful time, I
received another telephone call from the man who had earlier
left his repeated and hostile 2:00 am messages on my court
answering machine. His new message was short and sweet. He
actually apologized for the tenor of his earlier messages, and
then said, “I still think you are wrong, but I have decided that
you were doing the best that you could do.” 
What more can we ask for as judges, that a citizen who hon-
estly and genuinely believes that we are in error actually also
believes that we acted in good faith and were trying to be fair?
On the personal front, nobody filed against me, and near the
end of that year, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed my
ruling by an 8-1 vote.2 I retained my position on the trial court
through 2004, after which I did choose to retire from the bench. 
What did I learn from all this? Like the great majority of
state court judges, I had held an elected position and had been
subject to open public contests on a regular basis. That level of
scrutiny can be a bad thing if it makes us fearful of public reac-
tion, and it can be even worse if it makes us pander to vocal
opposition or causes us to deliver the popular decision rather
than the decision that is required by law.  But, in a closely
related phenomenon, and in what is barely the flip side of the
coin, I found that being subjected to elections can actually be
a good thing if it makes us more attentive to how we explain
our rulings to the parties and to interested citizens. 
Robert Alsdorf served as a superior court judge
in Seattle, Washington, from 1990 until 2005.
He now arbitrates and mediates cases in private
practice and serves as a distinguished jurist in
residence at Seattle University School of Law. In
the past 15 years, he has worked nationally and
internationally in various judicial and legal
educational programs, traveling to locations as
disparate as the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Liberia,
Malaysia, Nicaragua, and Uganda. He has led the American Bar
Association's efforts to help Sierra Leone rebuild its court system
following a 12-year civil war there.
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Initiative 695 was affirmed in 1999 by a significant marginof the direct popular vote in virtually all areas of the Stateof Washington.
Its constitutional validity and its reach are now being vig-
orously questioned. These legal challenges, which raise ques-
tions fundamental to a democracy, were filed in several coun-
ties by citizens and by public and private entities alike. They
have been consolidated in this Court for resolution.
NATURE OF THIS DECISION
The United States and its individual states have long been
guided by the adage that we citizens have a government of
laws and not of men. In accordance with this cherished prin-
ciple, court rulings must be made by reference to law and not
upon personal whim. A judicial ruling on the validity and
reach of a legislative act passed by an elected legislature, or of
an initiative or referendum passed directly by the citizenry, is
controlled by constitutional law.
Wherever we citizens fall on the political spectrum and
whatever our ideas on any given issue, we all agree that the
touchstone is the Constitution. For example, one citizen may
challenge a particular act or law on the grounds that it vio-
lates his or her right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment. Another citizen may contest yet another act or
law on the grounds that it violates his or her free speech
rights under the First Amendment. As citizens, we may and
frequently do disagree on specific policies. Nonetheless, our
agreement as citizens on a single point of reference, the
Constitution, keeps American democracy healthy and viable.
Depending upon the issue involved, courts are required to
refer either to the United States Constitution or to the
Constitution of their particular state, or to both.
Because this set of cases involved the structure of the
democracy established in the State of Washington, the ques-
tions presented for decision today are governed by our State
Constitution.
The Constitution of the State of Washington was drafted
in keeping with the legal traditions of the United States,
which find many of their origins in the American Revolution.
One of the central cries leading to the American Revolution
was “No taxation without representation!” Echoes of that
revolutionary spirit are found in the passage of Initiative 695.
However, there is a vital distinction which commands brief
discussion. The early revolutionary slogan expressed the sen-
timent that citizens wanted no taxation unless they were rep-
resented in the body that imposed the taxes. That is, we were
establishing a representative democracy. In a representative
democracy, citizens delegate authority to their elected repre-
sentatives—legislative, executive and judicial—to decide cer-
tain questions on behalf of the citizenry. A representative
democracy does not contemplate, let alone necessitate, a
direct vote of the citizens on every act of the government,
whether it be an act imposing, enforcing or collecting a tax,
or some other governmental act.
In contrast to the representative democracies established
after the Revolution, a direct democracy is one whose struc-
ture not only permits but requires a direct vote of the citizenry
on every act of its government. No state has such a govern-
ment in its purest form. However, in the early 1900’s there was
a strong populist movement in Washington and in other
states which sought to permit direct participation in the gov-
ernment when a sufficient number of citizens wanted such
participation. These populist movements established the right
of the citizenry in more than twenty states to more direct par-
ticipation by passing constitutional amendments that permit-
ted citizens to file and vote on initiatives and referenda. The
State of Washington is one of those states. As a result, the
State of Washington now has a democracy whose structure
has both representative and direct elements. Both elements of
our democracy, direct and representative, are established by
and are subject to the terms of our State Constitution.
The government of the State of Washington remains pri-
marily representative. The direct participation of citizens in
legislative activity is contemplated on those occasions when
the citizenry affirmatively so chooses, in keeping with either
the Constitution’s initiative process or its referendum process.
In order to deal properly with the constitutional chal-
lenges raised to Initiative 695, one must keep in mind the
distinctions between the representative and the direct ele-
ments of our democracy, and the manner in which these two
elements interact under our State Constitution.
Each of these constitutional challenges will be addressed
in turn below. 
* * *
Arguments may be made that we have a runaway tax-and-
spend government and that we need radical systemic change
in taxation or in other areas in order to make our govern-
mental entities responsive to the needs and the will of the 
citizens. Some citizens will agree. Some will not. Whatever
the wisdom of a particular proposed fiscal policy, the funda-
mental structure or system of our government can be
changed only by constitutional amendment. 
* * *
Because the timely filing of a referendum with a sufficient
number of signatures immediately suspends the operation of
the challenged act or law, the Constitution exempts from the
power of referenda all laws which are necessary to protect
public health and safety (i.e., the police power) and those
which are necessary for the support of the State and its exist-
ing public institutions.
The purpose of this portion of the Constitution is to
assure that the government can continue functioning despite
political differences of opinion. The reason for this limitation
is rooted in history.
* * *
If the Court redrafted Initiative 695 to require local refer-
enda but prohibit State referenda, as both [proponents of the
initiative] have urged, the Court would have rewritten the
Initiative and caused it to address a topic narrower than and
distinct from the loss of statewide MVET funding. That sort of
redrafting would be a legislative act, and not a proper judicial
function. 
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